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Challenges of the Modern Era
HonorableJohn J. Gibbons
In the first two decades of the twentieth century, the constitutional doctrine of the Court majority could fairly be summarized by two generalizations: the National Government has no
role to play in the protection of individual rights, and laissez-faire
economics is constitutionally required. Indeed, the Conservatives' lack of interest in enforcement of the Sherman Act was consistent with their constitutional position on laissez faire
economics. Neither government nor corporations should interfere with the free workings of the market system. By then, however, two appointees of progressive Presidents-Justice Holmes
andJustice Brandeis-had begun the task of forcing their brother
Justices to reconsider both propositions. It was slow going, with
far more defeats on both than victories. Perhaps if the United
States had stayed out of World War I, Holmes and Brandeis
might have made greater headway, at least with respect to the
protection of individual rights.' As Professor Belknap points out,
however, during and in the aftermath of that war, Attorney General Mitchell Palmer began to see subversives everywhere, particularly in the emerging labor movement. Indeed, he succeeded in
destroying the one national labor organization that at that time
amounted to anything. 2
A few bright spots existed, however. Justice Holmes succeeded in obtaining a majority for the proposition that Federal
habeas corpus relief was available for a state prisoner who had
been convicted in a trial dominated by a mob. That decision
overruled an opinion to the contrary written a few years earlier
by Justice Pitney. 4 In the 1927 case of Nixon v. Herndon,5 Holmes
succeeded in restoring the fifteenth amendment to the Constitution from its deep sleep after 1887; the Court held that the states
1 See generally P. MURPHY, WORLD WAR
THE UNITED STATES (1979).
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2 The International Workers of the World did not survive the Palmer era.
3 See Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (overruling Frank v. Mangum, 237

U.S. 309 (1915)).
4 See supra note 3.

5 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
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could not by law exclude blacks from the Democratic primary
elections. The Court also made a major step forward in the protection of individual political rights when it recognized in Near v.
Minnesota ex rel. Olson6 that the first amendment applied to the
states as well as to the Federal Government. On the whole, however, very little progress was made with respect to the protection
of individual rights through the Constitution until after the Second World War.
On the economic front, the critical event was the election of
Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1932. By 1937, the pressure that he put
on the Court through the famous Court-packing proposal and
the workings of the appointive process resulted in the abandonment of the Court's efforts to maintain that laissez-faire economics was constitutional law. The passage of the Wagner Act and
the decision in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.7 upholding the
.constitutionality of that statute meant that from thence forward,
labor organizations could no longer be treated as subversive.
It was organized labor that first forced the Court to reconsider the Civil Rights Acts, which had been passed in the 1870's
and had been largely buried. That reconsideration began in the
great 1939 case of Hague v. CIO,8 involving the attempt by a
prominent New Jersey politician to control a haven for runaway
sweatshops.' The Hague case might have led to progress for
other disadvantaged groups such as blacks and women had not
World War II interfered. During World War II, the Court largely
put the issues of individual rights on the back burner. In some
instances, the Court invented new doctrines such as abstention as
a means for avoiding the adjudication of civil rights cases.' 0 After the war, the same sort of hysteria that followed World War I
produced the McCarthy era, and the Court certainly did not distinguish itself by resisting that hysteria in any meaningful man6 283 U.S. 697 (1931). The Near holding that the first amendment applied to
the states by virtue of the fourteenth amendment had been articulated in Justice
Brandeis's dissenting opinion in Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 334 (1920)
(Brandeis,J., dissenting). Brandeis's position was assumed arguendo by the majority in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), but the Court held that no first
amendment violation was presented by that case.
7 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
8 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
9 For the background of the Hague v. CIO dispute, see Gibbons, Hague v. CIO: A
Retrospective, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 731 (1977).
10 See, e.g., Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); Beal v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 45 (1941).
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ner." Not until the decision in Brown v. Board of Education' 2 in
1954 did the Court begin to become a significant protector of the
rights of individuals. Shortly after that decision, in October of
1956, the next New Jersey Justice, William Brennan, took his
place on the Court.
II Perhaps the Court's least distinguished effort was Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494 (1951), in which the majority, although it could not agree on an opinion of the Court, upheld the constitutionality of the Smith Act, ch. 439, § 2, 54 Stat.
670, 671 (1940) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1982)) (providing criminal
sanctions for conspiring to overthrow the Government).
12 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

